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When is it legitimate to use images in moral arguments?  
The use of foetal imagery in anti-abortion campaigns as 
an exemplar of an illegitimate instance of a legitimate 
practice    
 
 
“Images are a powerful tool in a social movement’s arsenal. A single image can 
capture the hearts and minds of the broader public and come to symbolize a 
movement.” – Rohlinger and Klein 2012, 173 
 
“The use of medically generated images, and the human artifice that involves, does 
nothing to improve the quality of the abortion debate and is to be regretted.” – 
Kirklin 2004, 426 
 
In this paper, we aim to interrogate when the use of visual images in moral persuasion 
is acceptable.1 In order to do this, we will first set the stage by putting forward a 
number of accounts which in their varying foci purport to show that we are able to use 
tools other than strict logical argumentation to convince others, that certain tools 
evoke affective responses and that these responses have authority in the moral 
domain. These accounts, which we endorse, reject an opposition between affect—
understood as emotional responses—and reason. Second, after this stage-setting, we 
will turn to an account, put forward by Sarah McGrath, which focuses particularly on 
the use of imagery as a means to morally persuade. McGrath discusses four possible 
objections to the use of imagery in moral persuasion, and outlines responses to these 
objections that may be used to legitimate the use of imagery, in general, in moral 
arguments. For this paper, we accept that pictures can be used as tools of moral 
persuasion and accept that the invocation of affect has authority in relation to the 
ethical sphere. Finally, then, using McGrath’s four objection responses, we will 
examine whether anti-abortion campaigns present a legitimate instance of this 
practice.  
McGrath’s paper is, in her words, a “qualified defense (sic) of the use of 
pictures” (2011, 269), and one that outlines a general case for their use. While making 
the general argument, she concedes that there should be a case by case examination of 
both undue influence and claims of distortion, and that “one should be judicious in the 
use that one makes of pictures” (2011, 283) in moral arguments. The premises on 
which such distinctions may be made are, however, unclear. Our paper, then, is a 
rejoinder to McGrath in terms of starting to gain clarity around how to adjudicate the 
legitimate and illegitimate use of images in moral persuasion by examining the use of 
foetal imagery in anti-abortion activism as an example.  
Anti-abortion campaigns have long used images of aborted foetuses in an 
effort to convince people of the moral repugnance of abortion by revealing the so-
called truth that words cannot convey.2 The images used in these campaigns, typically 
printed on posters and presented on anti-abortion web-sites, evoke powerful affective 
responses meant to persuade the viewer that abortion is murder and thereby lead to 
anti-abortion action. As such the images are presented as non-moral facts—purely 
descriptive information—that, when viewed, will lead to a moral position that is anti-
abortion.  
 
The use of tools other than strict argumentation in moral persuasion 
To begin, it should be mentioned that it was long taken for granted in the 
philosophical community that only argumentation—providing logical and systematic 
verbal (or written) arguments in support of conclusions—provides a legitimate means 
of changing the minds of individuals, particularly when it comes to moral matters.3 Or 
put differently, changes of mind over moral matters were taken to be reasonable only 
when facts relayed in words served to undermine and eliminate prejudice and 
inferential error, resulting in reflective equilibrium—a position in which one has 
arrived at a comprehensive and coherent view on a subject that has taken into account 
all plausible conceptions of and arguments about the matter.4 Anything other than 
argument was often taken to be manipulation, and the use of imagery, in particular, 
was thought to be purely rhetorical—a manipulative effort to persuade.5 This 
approach was aligned with the Enlightenment movement, Rationalism and 
Cognitivism, all prevalent since the 17th Century and influenced by the work of, for 
example, Rene Descartes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant. 
However, in the late 20th Century, a number of philosophers began to examine 
the role that emotions play in ethical scenarios and the development of knowledge. 
Ronald de Sousa famously argued that emotions are rational—“are determinate 
patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry and inferential 
strategies… emotions ask the questions which judgment answers with belief” (1979: 
50-51). For de Sousa, emotions respond to value—are axiological—and so are related 
to ethics and enlarge the ethical sphere. While emotions respond to values, this does 
not mean they merely apprehend the world as it is. Rather, we must, he argues, 
acknowledge that certain values are created or invented, and that our emotions 
apprehend these values just as they apprehend ‘real’ values. Given means, we require 
a concept of authentic emotion, which de Sousa attempts to provide by employing the 
concept of a ‘paradigm scenario’—an original situation, involving a characteristic 
object, target or occasion of an emotion, in which the emotion in question is the 
‘normal’ response to the situation, which gives meaning to our present responses. 
While an inauthentic emotion does not correspond with objective reality, an authentic 
emotion, he argues, is one which is the appropriate response to a paradigm scenario. 
He writes: 
Emotional irrationality is a matter of muddled scenarios: a loss of reality… the “all-
things-considered” assessment of an emotion is determined in a complicated way: first, 
by determining whether the evoking situation is actually an instantiation of the paradigm, 
and secondly, by confronting it with other applicable paradigms and working the 
relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and hierarchic dominance between the 
relevant scenarios. This complicated process is at the centre of our moral life (De Sousa 
1979: 58-61). 
Similarly, Alison Jagger argues that our emotional responses may be 
necessary to the construction of knowledge. She claims that “recognizing certain 
neglected aspects of emotion makes possible a better and less ideologically biased 
account of how knowledge is, and so ought to be, constructed” (1989: 148). While 
Jagger is careful to point out that the very notion of emotion is difficult to 
conceptualise, given, for example, the broad range of emotions, she argues, contra 
positivism, that emotions are, unlike feelings, intentional, dispositional, contextual, 
and sometimes not a part of conscious awareness. She also argues against cognitivist 
approaches to emotion, claiming that these accounts replicate the very problem they 
are aiming to solve—the “artificial split between emotion and thought” (1989: 149). 
Instead, Jagger proposes that emotions are social constructs; emotions require 
concepts that are “socially constructed ways of organizing and making sense of the 
world” (1989: 151). Jagger sees our emotional responses and concepts as interrelated 
insofar as emotions presuppose language and a social order and, like de Sousa, 
believes that our emotions are able to focus our attention, precisely because she also 
believes that emotions presuppose—are logically and conceptually connected to—
values. For this reason, Jagger argues that the ‘dispassionate observer’ of traditional 
epistemology is a myth, which, she argues, serves a political function. As she puts it: 
[The dispassionate observer] functions, obviously, to bolster the epistemic authority of 
the currently dominant groups… and to discredit the observations and claims of many 
people of color and women. The more forcefully and vehemently the latter groups 
express their observations and claims, the more emotional they appear and so the more 
easily they are discredited. The alleged epistemic authority of the dominant groups then 
justifies their political authority (Jagger 1989: 158). 
Given this, she argues that ‘outlaw emotions’ be seen as directions for 
investigation, and be seen as appropriate “if they are characteristic of a society in 
which all humans… thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society” 
(1989: 161). Importantly, she argues that disadvantaged groups may have more 
appropriate emotional responses to situations in oppressive societies and “that 
discordant emotions should be attended to seriously and respectfully rather than 
condemned, ignored, discounted, or suppressed” (1989: 163). She writes: 
Our efforts to reinterpret and refine our emotions are necessary to our theoretical 
investigation, just as our efforts to reeducate our emotions are necessary to our political 
activity. Critical reflection on emotion is not a self-indulgent substitute for political 
analysis and political action. It is itself a kind of political theory and political practice, 
indispensable for an adequate social theory and social transformation... Emotions are 
neither more basic than observation, reason, or action in building theory, nor are they 
secondary to them. Each of these human faculties reflects an aspect of human knowing 
inseparable from the other aspects. Thus… the development of each of these faculties is a 
necessary condition for the development of all (Jagger 1989: 164-165). 
Like de Sousa and Jagger, Diana Tietjens Meyers defends the axiological nature of 
emotions. Meyers provides us with a plausible taxonomy of moral perception, which 
informs moral deliberation and moral judgment, as framed by moral outlook, which is 
constituted, first, by the concepts that allow for the generation of interpretations of 
situations, and, second, by our emotional attitudes. Given this taxonomy, our 
emotional attitudes, she argues, are crucial in the formation of our judgments of moral 
situations. Again, while she acknowledges that our emotional attitudes are intertwined 
with the concepts that allow us to interpret situations, she argues that since our 
emotional attitudes and responses can ‘outstrip’ our cognitive capacities, “it would be 
a mistake to collapse emotional attitudes into repertories of moral concepts” (1997: 
198). On the basis of this taxonomy, Meyers, like Jagger, suggests that certain 
heterodox (that is, unorthodox) emotional attitudes, like hypersensitivity, paranoia, 
anger and bitterness, should be given a certain amount of credence, because they 
allow those who suffer them (typically from subjugated groups, and, therefore, those 
who are not complacent) to identify injustice. According to Meyers, it is conventions 
of misinterpretation that block those who are ‘complacent’ about the status quo—the 
emotionally ‘vanilla’—from accepting these kinds of responses as justifiable, but that 
it is precisely because convention blocks us from understanding these responses as 
justifiable that we should take them seriously, should give them their due. Her 
account, then, also shows our emotional attitudes as responding to facts in the 
world—facts like injustice, oppression, and domination. Our emotional attitudes not 
only inform our moral outlook, which frames moral perception, they are also crucial 
in directing our attention to possible social ills.  
Arguments such as these about the role and axiological nature of emotion 
allow philosophers like Cora Diamond to establish that means other than argument 
can be successfully and legitimately used to change the minds of others about moral 
issues.  
In ‘Anything but Argument’ Diamond claims that appeals to the head may fail 
where appeals to the heart succeed. She writes:  
I believe that underlying the idea that we ought to use [the standard] approach is the idea 
that when someone is reasonably convinced of something, the convincing will have to be 
proceeded by arguments… and the capacities of his [sic] head and not of his heart will be 
all that is involved (Diamond 1995, 293). 
Opposing this view, Diamond claims that if an individual is not already inclined in the 
direction of the arguer, then the proposed argument, however reasonable, will likely 
fall on deaf ears. She argues, further, that this may be the case because the recipient of 
the argument has a limited moral imagination or an “intelligence inadequately 
trained” (ibid). In her words: 
Some hearts are not ‘already inclined’ some ways because their possessors have not 
exercised their imaginations in certain directions, have not been led to do so (Diamond 
1995, 294). 
Given the failure of reasonable argumentation to convince in certain cases, she claims 
that argument should be seen as only one way in which we may attempt to change the 
minds of others; and consequently that appeals to the heart may be called for rather 
than appeals only to the head. For Diamond, one particularly salient means of 
appealing to the heart is offered by literature, which she argues, providing examples 
from Charles Dickens, William Wordsworth, Henry James and Jane Austen, has the 
capacity to lead one’s interlocutor to “attend to the world and what is in it” (1995, 
296) and in so doing to exercise his/her moral imagination and sensibility. For 
Diamond, engagement with literature is able to teach us how to respond to the world 
appropriately—is able to educate the moral emotions—so that the affective 
judgements we make towards situations or objects in the world are thoughtfully 
engaged and not merely sentimental. She describes this process as learning how to 
think. She writes: 
In a sense, someone who has not learned to respond with the heart in such ways has not 
learned to think… for thinking well involves thinking charged with appropriate feeling… 
the investigation of facts, facts, facts cannot show us what we need in order to respond 
well to the world (Diamond 1995, 298-301).6 
Following Diamond’s lead, Christopher Cowley is also concerned to enlarge 
the category of legitimate means to change the minds of others over moral issues; he 
takes a legitimate means of convincing to be ‘transparent’ and he takes a transparent 
method to be one that the newly convinced individual would endorse “in a way he 
would not have done if he had become aware of a deception” (2005, 285). Cowley, 
too, concerns himself with appeals to the heart and imagination. Claiming that 
showing can be as legitimate as telling, Cowley says, “What I am trying to do in 
moral argument is to get the other to see things my way” (2005, 281). 
Mark Johnston, too, argues that affect has a particular authority in the moral 
domain. Like Diamond and Cowley, he believes that responding properly to the world 
requires 'appropriate affective engagement’ precisely because affect, he claims, like 
de Sousa, Jagger and Meyers, is ‘value-disclosing.’ The authority of affect, according 
to Johnston, lies in its ability to disclose values to us that make claims on us and 
structure our lives in terms of what we desire and do. He writes:  
Many great moral wrongs become possible only because of the absence of appropriate 
affect. The reaction “How could anyone have done this?” in the face of a horrible crime 
is typically not an expression of faith in the practical force of the Moral Law, but rather 
of sheer bewilderment at how any feeling human being could have failed to be repulsed 
by the horrible act in prospect… Absence of appropriate affect is an ethical defect 
(Johnston 2001, 193-194). 
We agree that tools other than argument can legitimately be used to change the minds 
of others over moral matters and, further, that these tools will include ones that appeal 
to the heart rather than the head, that appeal to emotion. While Diamond’s argument 
pertains primarily to the use of literature in such attempts to persuade, and Cowley 
and Johnston speak about the authority and importance of affective responses 
simpliciter, Sarah McGrath directly defends the use of pictures as tools of moral 
persuasion. In turning to McGrath’s argument we draw nearer to the aims of this 
paper—to interrogate whether the use of foetal imagery in anti-abortion campaigns is 
legitimate or illegitimate, and to explore what we can draw from this.  
 
McGrath’s four objections responses 
McGrath begins her 2011 paper by lauding the power of images to acquaint great 
numbers of people with a practice and to evoke in these people powerful visceral 
responses that arguments alone would probably fail to bring about. McGrath defends 
what she calls conversion experiences, which result from an individual’s having 
become acquainted with a practice through coming into contact with it either directly 
or, more likely, indirectly through a photograph.7 In the paper she sets out and 
responds to what she takes to be four primary reasons for objecting to the use of 
pictures as tools for moral persuasion. These objections and McGrath’s responses to 
them will frame the rest of this paper.  
First, it could be claimed, she thinks, that pictures provide an inadequate basis 
for generalisation. Given our ordinary inductive practices and given that a picture 
represents only one instance of a practice, drawing a general moral conclusion from a 
picture could be considered bad epistemic practice. However, according to McGrath, 
this objection rests on an overly simplified understanding of inductive reasoning, and 
that, in some cases, one is warranted in drawing a general conclusion from a specific 
instance. She argues that whether such a case is warranted depends on “whether it is 
reasonable for [one] to believe that the other members of that class share the features 
in question” (2011, 280).  
Second, it could be objected that individual responses to pictures are too 
subjective to form the basis of a normative decision. However, McGrath argues that 
individuals respond differently to philosophical argumentation as well, and given that 
changes of mind brought about by philosophical arguments are taken to epitomise 
rational belief change, variations in individuals’ responses should not be taken to 
undermine the use of pictures as tools for moral persuasion.  
Third, it could be objected that pictures are able to distort our judgements 
through drawing our attention to features that are morally irrelevant; one’s opinion of 
a practice may be distorted by, for example, the ‘grisliness’ of a picture of a practice. 
McGrath counters this objection by contending that our normative judgements are 
always at risk of being influenced by irrelevant features in the way in which a case is 
presented to us. She argues for a case by case examination of undue influence, since, 
she claims, the opposite can also happen—viewing a practice can allow one to make 
up one’s mind ‘unmediated’ by the descriptions of others.8  
Finally, it could be argued that pictures have a biasing effect because they 
present only some of the morally relevant features of a practice. They cannot, for 
example, represent temporal considerations that may play a central role in the moral 
permissibility of a practice, such as significant consequences in the future or causal 
factors in the past. McGrath responds to this objection by saying that this 
consideration should lead us to show more pictures rather than show no pictures at all. 
A subsidiary objection here concerns the net effect of seeing especially vivid pictures 
that, while representing morally significant features of a practice, overwhelm or 
‘swamp’ other equally morally significant features. In this case McGrath suggests that 
we should be careful to temper the kinds of pictures that we show, especially if other 
relevant considerations are “not the kind of thing that admit of being captured in a 
provocative visual representation” (2011, 285). 
While we may think that McGrath’s responses succeed, and therefore may 
think that the use of images is legitimate as a means to morally persuade others, our 
acceptance of a general practice does not translate, as McGrath herself points out, into 
acceptance of every instance of this practice. For this reason, let us now turn to the 
use of imagery in anti-abortion campaigns as one instance of this kind of practice, to 
interrogate whether these campaigns are safe from criticism—that is, to ask whether 
the use of images of aborted foetuses in anti-abortion campaigns is a legitimate 
instance of a legitimate practice, and what we may learn from this example 
concerning the adjudication of the use of images in moral persuasion. One way of 
proceeding is to ask whether the responses that McGrath gives to the imagined 
objections above can equally be used by anti-abortion activists in defence of 
campaigns that use images of aborted foetuses. In other words, let us see whether anti-
abortion activists are able to use McGrath’s responses in answer to the same 
objections.  
 
McGrath’s objection responses in relation to the use of foetal images in anti-
abortion campaigns 
In what follows we will discuss each of the four objections outlined by McGrath. 
Putting McGrath’s imagined objections into the context of anti-abortion campaigns 
we can ask: (i) Do the particular images chosen for use in anti-abortion campaigns 
provide an adequate basis for generalisation? (ii) Are the responses to these pictures 
too subjective to form the basis of a normative decision? (iii) Does the use of these 
images distort our judgements of abortion practices, and (iv) Do they have a biasing 
effect by presenting only some of the morally relevant features?  
 
Do the particular images chosen for use in anti-abortion campaigns provide an 
adequate basis for generalisation? 
Recall that McGrath responds to the objection that pictures provide an inadequate 
basis for generalisation by saying that there is nothing that precludes the possibility of 
pictures providing warranted generalisations in the moral domain. This warranted 
generalisation rests on the reasonableness of the assumption that other members of 
that class share the features in question. The particular pictures used in the anti-
abortion campaigns in which we are interested are an excellent example of the lack of 
reasonableness of this assumption. Typically pictures are chosen for their pure shock 
value. To do this, they are mostly taken of foetuses of late abortions when the foetus 
is identifiable as such (rather than a mass of bloody tissue). Even under liberal 
legislation, like that found in South Africa, where abortion is legal on request of a 
woman up to 12 weeks of gestation, later procedures are only performed under 
restrictive conditions, for example when the life of the woman is directly threatened 
by the pregnancy, when continued pregnancy will result in severe malformation of the 
foetus, or when there has been a late diagnosis of pregnancy. While the reality of 
these later procedures should be acknowledged9, it is misleading to present these 
images as if they are typical.  Given this, it seems clear to us that the use of these 
images does not provide an adequate basis for generalisation precisely because very 
few abortions of this sort are performed. Put differently, given that the vast majority 
of abortions are performed in the first trimester of pregnancy and that later procedures 
are performed towards the end of the second and in the third trimester, images of 
foetuses aborted at this late stage do not represent the typical case of abortion and are 
therefore inadequate in terms of providing a basis for generalisation. In the particular 
case of anti-abortion campaigns’ use of foetal imagery from late procedures, then, the 
objection stands and McGrath’s response cannot be used.10 
 
Are our responses to pictures of aborted foetuses too subjective to form the basis of a 
normative decision? 
The objector in this case argues that our responses to imagery are too subjective to 
form the basis of a normative decision. McGrath responds that our individual 
responses also vary when it comes to philosophical arguments, and, as such, that this 
is no reason to preclude the use of visual imagery. However, in the case of anti-
abortion campaigns, we can ask a particular version of this objection. This version 
does not refer specifically to the subjective/objective distinction, but rather to the 
subjectivities that are being deliberately appealed to by the use of images of aborted 
foetuses. When presenting these images, particularly to women, one could argue that 
an appeal is being made either to the subjectivity of motherhood, and, of course, all of 
the social obligations that accompany motherhood, or to the subjectivity that 
accompanies ‘feminine nature’—that those who are feminine will nurture and protect 
the weak.11 One could object, that is, that the implicit understanding at work in the 
presentation of these images is that pregnancy is either equivalent to motherhood or 
appeals to that which is feminine within women, that in presenting these images one 
is deliberately invoking particular responses, and that these particular responses ought 
not to form the basis of a normative decision. While it may seem that an appeal to a 
maternal or feminine subjectivity is warranted in this case, since the maternal body 
and its relation with the foetus is arguably central to the question of abortion, our 
concern is directed at the implication that to be pregnant is already to be a mother or 
invokes a feminine response and that this prescribes the kind of relationship that the 
woman is supposed to have with the foetus. The prescription of this role overwhelms 
any and all considerations of a woman’s right to control her reproductive destiny.  
 
Does the use of images of aborted foetuses distort our judgments of abortion 
practices? 
In answering the above question it is of interest to distinguish between two different 
types of foetal images used in anti-abortion campaigns. The first type of image 
pictures ‘grotesque’ and bloody, sometimes dismembered, aborted foetuses. The 
second type of image, in contrast to the ‘grisliness’ of the first, is rather beautiful. 
Importantly, while the first type of image is obviously of an aborted foetus the second 
type of image—exemplified by the artistic photography of Lennart Nillson—
represents the foetus as still alive, inside the womb, although this is not the case. 
Nilsson’s photographs, used by anti-abortionists since the 1970’s (and still in current 
usage),12 are breathtakingly beautiful and romanticise the foetus as a person despite 
the fact that they are taken of aborted foetuses.  
 Let us begin by examining the second type of image, since it seems to us that 
the case in favour of them distorting our judgements is, in certain respects, clearer 
than that of the first. The use of these romantic types of images by anti-abortionists 
can be attacked on two grounds.  
The first draws upon a popular critique among feminist scholars that such 
images present the foetus as independent and autonomous. This critique, or versions 
of it, can be drawn from the work of, for example, Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, 
Elizabeth Maier-Balough, Ingrid Zechmeister and Joanne Boucher.13 In each case, 
medicalised foetal images—purportedly uncoded, objective, empirical and 
informational snapshots of reality—are criticised for decontextualising the foetus 
from the womb, representing the foetus as isolated—floating freely in space—and, 
thereby, as autonomous and independent of the woman’s body. As Petchesky puts it: 
Fetal imagery epitomizes the distortion inherent in all photographic images: their 
tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits wrenched out of real space and time (Petchesky 
1987, 268 sic). 
The foetus, in these images, is presented as ‘already a baby’ or, as Zechmeister puts it, 
as a ‘tiny, independent human being’ separate from the pregnant woman. Maier-
Balough claims that the use of such images “[buttress] the logic of fetal personhood” 
(2010: 4 (sic)). The pregnant woman within whose body the foetus resides is rendered 
invisible. Given this, Boucher argues that images of the public foetus are “never 
politically neutral or innocent” (2004, 70).  
 The second ground focuses more particularly on the features of photographs 
briefly mentioned above: that photographs are taken to be uncoded, objective, 
empirical and informational snapshots of reality. Philosophers of photography capture 
this feature by describing photographs as transparent, as traces of reality. 
Transparency here literally refers to seeing reality—to seeing the world as it is. A 
photograph, in this sense, positions the viewer in front of what is represented and 
gives them immediate access to that which is photographed. Given this, we are said to 
be able to experience and learn about the world through photographs in the same way 
that we would if we were in fact present at the place where the photograph was taken.  
This second critique is rather obvious, especially insofar as Nilsson’s 
photographs are concerned. Remember that while Nilsson’s photographs purport to 
represent the reality of pregnancy, of the foetus as living inside the womb, they do not 
represent what they depict. As already briefly mentioned, these photographs are taken 
in Nilsson’s studio of aborted foetuses where Nilsson was able to manipulate the 
lighting and the position of the foetus—say as sucking its thumb—for example. Given 
that these photographs do not in fact depict what they purport to portray, the question, 
glossed over by McGrath, concerning the veracity of images arises. McGrath starts 
the section in which she responds to the four objections outlined above with the 
caveat: “Let us set aside the case of pictures that have been doctored or that present 
their subjects in a misleading light” (2011, 278). While McGrath uses this as a 
foundation to argue for her qualified defence of the use of images, the question of the 
transparency of images is crucial to distinguishing between the legitimate and 
illegitimate use of images.  In this case, the viewer only has access to the romanticised 
world of foetal life as depicted through Nilsson’s artistry and imagination. Again, 
while these images are represented as medical images, they are not; these foetuses are 
not alive inside the womb but aborted and positioned by Nilsson himself.  
 Let us, then, turn our attention to the first type of image used by anti-
abortionists, the grislier type of image meant to evoke in the viewer a response of 
disgust towards the practice of abortion through the shocking nature of the images 
used.  
One of the most famous of these campaigns was launched by the Prolife 
Alliance in Britain in 1997—although it was censored as the images used “were 
deemed too shocking to be screened on British television” (Cull 1997, 517). Nicholas 
J. Cull describes some of the images used: 
We see a severed head. A bisected head is lifted. Its mouth is open. Tiny fingers curl 
round forceps. Pieces of leg and hand are lifted on a gloved hand. Gloved hands cradle a 
large fetus, and caress its head, making a powerful visual claim that the remains shown 
are those of a human infant. A large fetus is held over a tape measure. An eyeball falls 
loose from a pile of fetal material. The sequence ends with the caption: ‘Some choices are 
wrong’ (Cull 1997, 516). 
Both the BBC and ITV refused to show the broadcast whilst it contained these 
images, claiming that they offended against standards of decency and taste. After 
losing an appeal, the Alliance censored the broadcast but included the following 
statement: ‘If something is so horrifying that we are not allowed to see it, perhaps we 
should not be tolerating it’ (Cull 1997, 518).  
Again, it is essential to bear in mind here that anti-abortionists claim to be 
showing us the truth behind abortion—a non-moral fact (the foetus has an 
autonomous, independent life) that should influence our moral position on abortion 
(abortion is murder and therefore morally abhorrent). These photographs are the 
hardest to deal with because for all intents and purposes they are, unlike the framed or 
artistically designed photographs already discussed, purporting to depict the aborted 
foetus as it is ‘in reality’. What you are seeing in these pictures is ‘real’ insofar as 
what you are presented with—an aborted foetus—is precisely that. One could argue 
that these photographs are also mediated by the photographer—that they are shot in a 
certain way, in a certain light, from a certain angle or that the contents of the 
photograph have been ‘cleaned up’ so that we can recognise what we are seeing as a 
human foetus rather than, say, a mass of bloody tissue. While these objections may 
hold some force, what seems more relevant, and what is not covered specifically by 
McGrath, is the manner in which these pictures are framed.  
Typically the images are accompanied by verbal arguments, which the images 
are meant to reinforce. At times, the framing is simple punchy statements, as 
suggestive of a world of words as the images are. For example, one poster places a 
picture of the limbs of an aborted foetus underneath the word ‘choice’—capitalised 
and placed within scare quotes. This image is framed in such a way as to make the 
discourse of a woman’s right to choose what happens to and in her body repulsive. 
Another image is accompanied with the statement, “Since 1973, way over 40 
MILLION innocent babies have been chopped up and slaughtered in the American 
abortion mills”,14 and asks the question whether politicians will stop the American 
abortion holocaust.  
Let us take the latter example further in terms of arguing that it is not simply 
the images that are important, but also how they are framed. Likening the practice of 
abortion to genocide is not new in anti-abortion circles. These campaigners believe 
that showing us grisly images of aborted foetuses is just the same as showing us 
pictures of the victims of the Holocaust, for example. To show us these pictures is to 
put us in touch with ‘reality’, for us to literally see the heinousness of the crime we 
are allowing to take place and are thereby complicit in. In other words, the main 
purpose of the analogy is to refer to the number of abortions that have taken place and 
to imply complicity in a terrible crime, thereby heightening our affective responses.  
However, this analogy cannot work because foetuses are not being targeted qua 
foetus, as the Jews were during the Holocaust or the Tutsis were during the Rwandan 
genocide, but are rather aborted for individual and varying reasons in each case.  
The question of how an image is framed is not addressed by McGrath and yet 
we believe that this should be central in adjudicating the legitimacy of the use of 
images in moral persuasion, and we return to Diamond’s input for guidance in this 
regard. Recall that Diamond argued that literature is able to educate the moral 
emotions in ways that ensure that the affective judgements we make are thoughtfully 
engaged rather than emotive or sentimental responses. Extending this to our own 
example, the manner in which images used in moral argument are framed should 
ensure that the affective judgements we make on the basis of the images are 
thoughtfully engaged.   
 
Does the use of images of aborted foetuses have a biasing effect by presenting only 
some of the morally relevant features of the practice? 
Let us now turn to the final objection that photographs—as representations of time 
slices—fail to represent potentially morally significant events that take place in both 
the past and future that would potentially alter the way in which we think about a 
moral issue. In the case of abortion we find this to be especially pertinent. However, 
before we go on to discuss this particular objection, we must note some concerns 
about the very notion of bias itself.  
A number of feminist scholars, particularly feminist philosophers of science 
and epistemologists, have put forward arguments defending the importance of situated 
knowledge, which in various ways challenge the concept of bias. Donna Haraway 
writes: 
I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision and so reclaim the sensory 
system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering 
gaze from nowhere… I would like a doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates 
paradoxical and critical feminist science projects: Feminist objectivity means quite 
simply situated knowledges (Haraway 1988: 581). 
Nancy Hartsock, too, refers to our necessarily ‘situated knowledge’, and the 
importance of knowledge available to (primarily) subordinated groups located in a 
particular social and collective time and space. She argues that: 
rather than insist on the false dichotomy of the neutrality of reason as opposed to bias, 
these views from below [situated knowledge] recognize the multiple and contradictory 
nature of their reality. Lack of neutrality need not mean lack of knowledge (Hartsock 
1990: 32).  
Similarly, Helen Longino argues that “scientific inquiry should be expected to display 
the deep metaphysical and normative commitments of the culture in which it 
flourishes” (1987: 55), an argument that undermines the very idea of an unbiased or 
‘value-free science.’ Sandra Harding, in a discussion of feminist epistemologies, 
problematises the notion of bias still further. In a discussion of feminist 
epistemologies—notably feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theories—
Harding notes that the concept of objectivity is, on these accounts, no longer held 
apart from value-neutrality, but, rather, that certain commitments to, for example, 
emancipatory values increase the objectivity of science. While Harding discusses 
problems inherent in these epistemologies, she notes that ‘logical incoherencies’ 
brought to light by feminist epistemologies bring to the fore concerns about 
epistemology and scientific inquiry simpliciter.15  
If we agree with these accounts then bias should be conceived more like a 
shifting horizon of understanding that accommodates situated knowledge.16 However, 
remember that, in this context, McGrath is speaking about a particular biasing effect, 
which results either from being presented with an image that depicts only some (and 
therefore neglects other) morally relevant features of a practice, or from being 
presented with images that are so powerfully evocative that they ‘swamp’ any 
consideration of other morally relevant features. For the sake of argument, we follow 
McGrath in her particular use of the concept.  
 The decision to abort a pregnancy occurs within a context that is essential to 
understanding the moral dimensions and permissibility of the practice. Quite apart 
from certain pregnancies that threaten the lives of women, and pregnancies that result 
from rape or incest—in certain countries where abortion is legal, these are the only 
reasons taken to justify it—there exist further socio-cultural, traditional, financial or 
religious reasons that could be taken to justify an abortion. Indeed, proponents of a 
reproductive justice approach argue that the overarching socio-economic inequalities, 
racism and gendered power relations that shape women’s lives as well as the range of 
contextual circumstances—such as partner selection, sexual assault, trafficking and 
sexual exploitation, STIs and HIV, health care practices and contraceptive 
availability, as well as the fact that legalising abortion significantly reduces maternal 
morbidity and mortality—should all shape our judgements concerning abortion.17 
McGrath alludes to this in indicating that 
One can witness an abortion, or pictures of aborted foetuses. But if the fact that carrying a 
pregnancy to term would involve significant hardships for the woman, some of those 
hardships might not be the kinds of thing that admit of being pictured, even in principle 
(McGrath 2011, 285-286). 
In this, McGrath refers to ‘downstream’ consequences, but it could equally well be 
argued that the circumstances that led to the woman having an unwanted and 
unsupportable pregnancy do not easily lend themselves to highly provocative images 
and yet are no less significant in the moral argumentation around abortion.  
 Moreover, recall the concern, raised by Petchesky, Maier-Balough, 
Zechmeister and Boucher, that foetal imagery fails to present the foetus within the 
body of the pregnant woman, but rather presents the foetus as independent and 
autonomous. We initially raised this concern in light of the potential of this imagery 
to distort our judgements of abortion practices but it is equally important here. That is, 
we can equally well argue that the images of aborted foetuses chosen for anti-abortion 
campaigns bias us by failing to present the woman within whose body the foetus is 
housed. We saw earlier that the pregnant woman’s body and thereby her self literally 
fades out of view in these images. We are presented only with the foetus seemingly 
floating freely in space. Making the foetus visible in this way results, according to the 
Petchesky, in the invisibility of the woman and consequently in the negation of her 
role “as [agent] of [her] reproductive [destiny]” (Petchesky 1987, 279). The images 
used in anti-abortion campaigns, then, must be seen to bias us by failing to present all 
of the morally relevant features of the practice precisely because the woman, her 
desires and surrounding circumstances are absent. The personal and social locatedness 
of the woman’s actions must be taken to be morally relevant.  
 
Conclusion 
It may seem strange that we have set this debate up in terms of appeals to the heart—
to affective responses—since the anti-abortionists themselves see their use of imagery 
as revealing the truth of abortion that words cannot convey. Revealing the truth, it 
may seem, is precisely to appeal to the head and not the heart—to appeal to 
rationality and not to sentiment. However, affective responses, as we have shown 
through presenting the arguments of de Sousa, Jagger, Meyers, Diamond, Cowley and 
Johnston, should not be seen as opposing rationality. Indeed, affective responses 
themselves by disclosing value, directing our attention, and making available to us 
our inherent moral judgments should not be seen as merely sentimentally evocative. 
Rather, they presuppose rationality.  
McGrath’s qualified defence of the use of images in moral arguments is 
persuasive. If we accept that images may be used in this way, then the question 
remains, how do we judge the legitimate or illegitimate use of images? In this paper 
we have used the images of aborted foetuses used in anti-abortion campaigns as an 
exemplar of what we consider to be an illegitimate use of images. Using McGrath’s 
objection responses we argued that the particular images chosen by anti-abortionists 
provide an inadequate basis for generalisation, that they appeal to particular kinds of 
subjectivity that prompt particular responses, that they distort our judgements of 
abortion practices, and that they present only some of the morally relevant features 
with regard to abortion. In addition, we argued that elements glossed over or ignored 
by McGrath, namely the veracity of the images and the framing thereof, require 
consideration. If we are correct then the current, typical use of foetal imagery in anti-
abortion campaigns is an illegitimate instance of a legitimate practice—is an 
illegitimate means of appealing to affect in the hopes of morally persuading.  
But what follows from this? Can we now generalise from this case to other 
cases, or should we, following McGrath, accept that we must conduct a case-by-case 
examination of the use of images? While we cannot generalise from the argument 
presented here to general principles concerning the determination of illegitimacy, we 
can point to ways in which we might question the particular use of certain images as 
tools for moral persuasion. Precisely because we have shown that the anti-abortionist 
cannot respond to the objections McGrath sets out with the responses that she 
provides, we are able to suggest that the objections and responses McGrath sets out, 
as well as concerns we have raised, be used as rough guidelines in any particular case 
examination. During an examination we might consider, then, whether other members 
of the class share the features in question, whether they appeal to particular 
subjectivities and whether these subjectivities ought to form the basis of a normative 
decision, whether the images distort the judgment of the viewer or present only some 
of the morally relevant features of a practice, as well as the veridical nature and 
framing of images.   
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1 While we acknowledge that we live in a world that is saturated with images—many of which are 
photo-shopped—and that the textual and aural realms also play a role in stimulating affective 
responses, we confine our analysis here to visual images that are presented as factual and are intended 
to invoke affective responses in an attempt to morally persuade. 
2 Of course, pro-abortionists have also appealed to visual images in their campaigns, such as images of 
illegal abortions. Their use of images may be open to the same critiques we offer here. While we 
acknowledge this fact we have chosen to deal with the anti-abortionist’s use of foetal imagery in this 
paper. 
3 In this paper, we confine our analysis to changing the minds of individuals. The abortion debate is at 
once a political question, a deeply personal dilemma and a moral question. We do not pretend to 
capture the multi-faceted nature of the debate; rather we interrogate the question of moral persuasion in 
                                                 
understanding the moral status of abortion and follow the philosophical trend of focusing on individual 
engagement with moral issues.    
4 See, for instance, Christopher Cowley’s description of what he calls the Optimist’s standard view in 
‘Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters’. The assumption here is that argumentation only takes place 
legitimately via words.  
5 The assumption behind this approach is that sound philosophical argument does not count as 
manipulation, and, more fundamentally, that it is legitimate to try and engage in moral persuasion—a 
practice that philosophers have engaged in since Socrates.  
6 Diamond’s position here is compatible with the view that emotions and judgements (or thoughts) are 
intimately interwoven. This is something that has been emphasised by feminist scholars opposing 
masculinist, rationalist approaches to science and education. Indeed what we have called the standard 
view above is compatible with just such a rationalist approach.  
7 Both we and McGrath are primarily interested in photographs that claim to represent the direct truth. 
In a broader discussion it would be interesting to distinguish between these types of images and those, 
such as art-images, that represent an interpretation of the ‘truth’. That is, not all images claim to be 
unmediated or ‘transparent’. This paper, however, does not need to consider this distinction given that 
the images chosen in anti-abortion campaigns are of the first kind—those that claim to represent 
‘reality’. Thanks to Louise dui Toit for bringing this to our attention. 
8 Renita Coleman, in her paper ‘The Effects of Visuals on Ethical Reasoning: What’s a Photograph 
Worth to Journalists Making Moral Decisions’ also objects to the claim that images distort our 
judgments. Coleman argues, based on empirical evidence, that photographs may in fact improve 
individuals’ ethical reasoning through what she calls mental elaboration—thinking through the 
situation of those affected by an ethical situation. Coleman argues that “images induce people to think 
deeply” (p.836). That is, her findings suggest that images provoke not only our affective but also our 
cognitive information processing centres. She writes: “Photographs activate automatic processing, 
resulting in emotion and an “it feels right” intuition about an ethical decision, but photographs also 
activate explicit processing—as evidenced by greater mental elaboration about stakeholders by these 
participants” (pp.845-846). 
9 See, for instance, Harris, L.H. ‘Second Trimester Abortion Provision: breaking the silence and 
changing the discourse’ in Reproductive Health Matters Vol.16(31 Suppl): pp. 74-81(2008). 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Images that may not fall prey to this argument include the 8/10-week foetus positioned next to a 
dime, and 10-week foetal feet often made into label pins worn by abortion opponents. Given that these 
depictions are said to be medically accurate, they may form the basis of a generalisation. However, the 
further question, here, is whether these images are as provocative as those used from later procedures. 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.   
11 In terms of the latter, see Kumar A, Hessini, L. & Mitchell, E.M.H. ‘Conceptualising abortion 
stigma’ in Culture, Health and Sexuality Vol.11(6) pp. 1 -15 (2009). 
12 See, for instance, Wade, L. ‘Visualising the Fetus’ (webpage) 
13 See also Kate Gleeson’s ‘Captured (and disturbing for some): A last look at the abortionist’ in 
Women’s Studies International Forum Vol.34 pp.520-529 (2011) and Julie Palmer ‘Seeing and 
Knowing: Ultrasound images in the contemporary abortion debate’ in Feminist Theory Vol.10(2) 
pp.173-189 (2009) 
14 http://shatteredparadigm.blogspot.com/2008/06/over-40-million-dead-babies-will-either.html 
15 For example, Harding examines feminist empiricist arguments that women scientists provide us with 
an “enlarged perspective” and one that is more likely “to notice androcentric bias” (1986: 25). She 
argues that in claiming that women produce less biased scientific results as a group than men as a 
group, feminist empiricism subverts the empiricist project itself, which focuses not on the selection of 
projects of interest but on justification, testing and interpretation. 
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for brining this important point to our attention. 
17 See Chrisler’s (2012) edited collection as well as West (2009). 
                                                                                                                                            
